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Abstract 
The European Union has grown up in terms of influence and size in 
international politics. The size of its economy and the ever-increasing 
membership, have seen its ambitions grow meaning that the EU now has an 
international presence it did not have at its formation. It is easy to say that 
with the EU being an ambitious actor in international politics, the rise into 
prominence of climate change naturally came in handy for the EU as it 
provided an opportunity for the EU to assert itself and prove both its capacity 
and presence. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the withdrawal of the USA 
from the obligations of the Kyoto came as a blessing in disguise for the 
Union as it seized the moment to assert itself. Thus, in trying to understand 
what role the EU has or is playing in international climate change politics, 
there is need to assess its leadership claims and what it has done to prove 
these claims. To get there, the paper will navigate through a part of the 
discipline of International Relations (IR) to understand how it provides for a 
basis to explain or understand the EU’s limitations and strengths on 
actorness. 
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Introduction 
As with many other issues –dealing with economic crises, combating 
global terrorism and controlling the proliferation of nuclear and mass 
destruction weapons- climate change is commonly regarded as one of the 
most urgent and pressing issues of our time to be found high on the political 
agenda at all levels-locally, nationally, internationally, and of course at the 
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level of the European Union (EU). Recognising climate change as a global 
problem and need to take the issue seriously, the international community, 
thus, has been actively interested in the impact and causes of this 
phenomenon at global level since the 1970’s. Moreover, in order to deal with 
this threat, an international climate change regime under United Nations 
(UN) was established after rounds of international negotiations (Gupta & 
Grubb, 2000, p.16). As a naturel consequence of these developments, the 
governments have found themselves under intense pressure to deliver policy 
solution to deal with climate change since that period. In this context, the EU 
set out its ambitions as early as 1988 announcing that it should, itself, take 
the lead in climate action. As a result, the EU’s attention, over the last 
decade, has been primarily focused on developing a coherent plan to infuse 
climate change into its international commitments leading to the EU being 
characterised as a leader in international climate change policy (Bretherton & 
Volger, 2006; Oberthuur, 2007).  
It is easy to say that with the EU being an ambitious actor in 
international politics, the rise into prominence of climate change naturally 
came in handy for the EU as it provided an opportunity for the EU to assert 
itself and prove both its capacity and presence (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). 
However, while the European Union has been actively and progressively 
engaging itself in tackling climate change, the EU has largely failed in 
exporting its policy solutions to the international level, as Copenhagen 
conference demonstrates in 2009. The fact that no legally binding agreement 
was reached to succeed the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord 
itself is hardly reflective of the EU ambitions reflects negatively on the EU 
capabilities on the tasks it has set for itself. Because of that, this leads to the 
old questions again: is the EU really an actor in international politics? Is it 
capable, and does it possess the capacity to deliver what the commission 
espouses? How does an organisation like the EU become an actor in the 
context of International Relations when it is not state?  Thus, the paper shall 
seek to underpin the theoretical attempts to integrate new actors into the 
discipline of IR and how that sheds light into the potentials, the possibilities, 
successes and failures of the EU’s actorness and how they have enhanced 
their involvement on the climate regime. Finally and more crucially, this will 
feed into the Climate Change which is at the core of the enquiry and 
analysis. How has EU involvement in climate politics enhanced its actorness 
on global politics and development?   
 
Understanding EU’s Actorness 
Traditionally, actorness has largely been judged by the states’ 
involvement in ‘high politics’ (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.3) which refers 
to security and foreign policies. In other words, the ability to use force and 
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the impact on other actors in the world politics is the determinant of great-
power status. According to the classical and realist approach, only states are 
actors and other organisations or transnational enterprises are simply 
acknowledged or given certain status commensurate with their relevance 
then but they still remain understood to be below the states in terms of 
international status. In this sense, ‘realism,’ write Bretherton and Vogler, 
‘provides an essentially political analysis in which power differentials 
between states area central focus. Ultimately, the actors of interest to Realists 
are powerful states’ (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.19). 
Therefore, issues such as environment, or climate politics are 
considered peripheral as they don’t readily make for ‘high politics’ and in 
this case what makes this interesting is the fact that the EU’s beginnings 
itself saw these issues also peripheral with the Commission interested in the 
economic issues more. The limited scope of the EU’s origins -that is the 
quest for economic revival and stability in the aftermath of the Second 
World- can serve as the basis to explain the EU’s actorness on international 
change politics today.  As we can see, the initial agenda of the EU was 
limited meaning that the EU naturally became largely civilian concerned 
with economic revival and less with other issues such as foreign and security 
policy. Despite the fact that the EU did make attempts at environmental 
policy through the Single Market Act of 1987 and the treaties of Maastricht 
(1992) and Amsterdam (1997) and finally Lisbon (2009); and also made 
headway in some specific issues such as acid rain through the Large 
Combustion Plants Directive, issues of the environment and climate change 
were not so much of an issue in the EU agenda until 1990s (Oberthuur, 
2007). 
From this approach to International Relations the EU’s potential to 
grow into a political giant in international affairs was naturally doomed to be 
overlooked. And yet over the years these issues, particularly climate change, 
have become relevant and this has been confirmed by the publicity and 
attendance enjoyed by the Copenhagen conference in 2009. Indeed, 
Bretherton and Vogler (2006) believe that once we accept the significance of 
climate change as a key arena of contemporary international relations, 
perhaps even achieving the status of high politics, we are forced to consider 
the EU itself as an actor. 
And yet the EU’s status is not without problems. The ‘EU’, says 
Ginsberg (1999), ‘is neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a 
conventional international organisation nor an international regime’ 
(Ginsberg, 1999, p.432). For that reason alone it is difficult to define it as a 
great power in the real sense of the phrase and yet the EU is present and 
influential in international politics particularly in issues to do with the 
economic development, humanitarian aid and assistance and environment 
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where it plays a significant role in policy shaping and delivery and 
international negotiations (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Zito, 2005). 
Therefore, it can be seen that the EU as one of the newer participants in 
global politics and a rather different type of an actor in IR poses some 
difficulties for analysis of its actorness as it sometimes acts as a state, but 
fundamentally it is not a state (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). In essence, the EU 
languishes in the grey area between a state and an international organisation 
something which triggers up all manner complexities in trying to theorise on 
the EU’s actorness on the international stage. And yet still it has over the 
years asserted itself progressively in a way that its actorness has attracted a 
huge body of comment.  
Despite the fact that in traditional international relations terms only 
states with right to sign treaties with other states qualify as actors in the 
world system (Bull, 1982; Mearsheimer, 2007), scholarship has evolved with 
the spread of the EU influence to pay attention to this phenomenon which 
renders the EU as a special kind of an actor. As has been said, this complex 
nature of the EU manifests itself more vividly in the sense that it is some 
kind of an emerging state with features of a state while at the same time it 
remains an international organisation bringing together fragmented activity 
with itself acting as the convener and an overseer (Elgstrom & Smith, 2006). 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999) have also treated the EU as an actor in its own 
right with a legal status in the international system.  As the EU’s impact on 
the international stage has tended to deepen over the years terms like 
‘actorness’ and ‘presence’ have equally evolved to assume broader or 
dynamic meanings and since the 1970’s scholarship has played its part in all 
this development. Scholarship varies as to the explanation of developments 
such as a pattern alluded to above. In trying to explain these complexities, 
one cannot fail to think of Bretherton and Volger (2006), Jupille and 
Caporaso (1998) whose analysis shed more light as opposed to confusing 
and concealing. Their views just as does those of Hill (1993) will help not 
only to understand the dynamics and complexities of EU actorness but to test 
the fact  that the EU is indeed active in international climate politics but there 
is something lacking in terms of its capacity to lead.  
While these are complementary, as has been said earlier, one cannot 
fail to see how Bretherton & Vogler (2006) further resonates with Hill’s 
thesis of credibility expectations gap which is mainly about what one might 
call the EU’s inherent problem-the ‘painful contrast between what publics or 
outsiders might think the EU could/should do, and what it actually could 
deliver’ (Hill, 1993, p.3). It will be worthwhile to look into these scholars’ 
assertions so as to gain an in-depth understanding of the complexities 
attendant to the EU policy.  Clearly, the EU’s participation means that while 
it is not a state, the EU is a ‘presence’ with recognisable influence and the 
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patterns of behaviour means that the EU cannot be ignored by the states and 
other international organisations (Ginsberg, 1999). Over the years, and 
despite the varying interpretations, scholarship is almost united in the view 
that the EU’s participation on the international politics can no longer be 
contested and neither can the EU’s actor status be diminished. And yet 
problems still persist.     
 
EU Leadership in Climate Change and the Development of the Global 
Climate Change Regime 
Once we have accepted that the EU is an actor of note in international 
politics, we almost certainly cannot avoid enquiring what its role has been or 
is in one of the most pressing issues of our time-climate change. First, the 
rise of climate change in the international development radar has seen many 
EU countries and the EU itself seeking to shape the global climate regime. 
Secondly, the EU itself considers itself a leader in global climate policy and 
that view is universally recognised by leading climate practitioners and is 
shared amongst the media and the scientists. The failure or refusal of the US 
to commit to the global environmental regimes in the 1990’s and the 
combination of unwillingness and inability of other nations such as China, 
Russia and Japan amongst many to take the lead came in handy for the EU. 
Already harbouring leadership the EU seized the moment and did not just 
throw its weight about trying to shape the global climate regime but literally 
declared itself as a leader.         
Therefore, in trying to understand what role the EU has or is playing 
in global climate change politics, there is need to assess its leadership claims 
and what it has done to prove these claims. Scholarship seems consistent in 
the assertion that leadership is of crucial importance in the multilateral 
organisations (Gupta & Ringius, 2001; Sannerstedt, 2005). These scholars 
emphasize on the importance of leadership in order that agreements may be 
reached and so does Sannerstedt (2005) who believes that leadership is a key 
to forestalling deadlocks and to ‘ease the negotiations’ way to sound 
solutions. With clear leadership, problems attendant to multilateral 
negotiations are better dealt with (Nabers, 2008).  
Leadership, says Underdal, (1994) refers to ‘an asymmetrical 
relationship of influence, where one actor guides or directs the behaviour of 
others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time’ (Underdal, 1994, 
p.178). It is a ‘relationship between a leader and followers’ (ibid. p. 181). 
Fundamental to this relationship are the ways in which the leaders supply the 
demands and share the responses of the followers. Nabers (2008) proffers yet 
another interesting observation about the dynamics of leadership. 
‘Leadership’, he argues, ‘is always contested by challenges from those who 
are left out of what we will call a ‘hegemonic project’, and sometimes from 
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those who find themselves in a subordinate position to the leader’ (Nabers, 
2008, p.9). 
While there is no disputing that these scholars including a range of 
scholars, for example, Oberthuur and Kelly (2008), Bretherton and Vogler 
(2006), Zito (2005), have zealously dwelt on the EU’s engagements around 
the Kyoto Protocol, Oran R. Young (1991) is probably one of the more 
significant in this context of multilateral negotiations. Young (1991) is best 
known for his theory of three forms of leadership: structural, entrepreneurial, 
and intellectual leadership all of whom have been seen to be influenced by a 
neo-realist approach to international relations. Young is countered by 
Alexandra Lindenthal (2009) who argues that the principles of neo-realism 
hardly conform to the nature of the nations’ relationships with regards 
climate change. Based on the constructivist outlook Lindenthal (2009), as 
cited in Kellerhaus (2010) proposes her own types of leadership: self-
serving, Norm-establishing, problem-solving and mediating. She also 
identifies leadership indicators as interests, resources, power, norms and 
communication meaning that the rate, extent and manner in which a leader 
exhibits or exercises these indicators will indicate what type of a leader they 
are and will also determine their success on a particular area of action. For 
example, to achieve particular interests a self serving leader may go an extra 
mile by over relying on their material resources to control other actors.  
At face value these forms of leadership may seem separate and yet at 
practice and reality level they appear not to be mutually exclusive per se. The 
manner in which the EU has conducted itself with regards the global 
environmental politics may help to illustrate this. Between 1990 and 2007, 
Lindenthal (2009), as cited in Kellerhaus (2010), argues, the EU has 
practiced all these forms of leadership. For example, the EU has never 
hidden its intentions to export its norms to other regions and nations and the 
case of the environmental protection proves this because the protection of the 
environment is an indisputable EU value. The EU has also played a 
mediating role on many occasions, solved problems and in this case it is 
indeed determined to solve the problem of climate change. Just as it is in the 
interests of the smaller nations to have climate change tackled it is also in the 
EU interests to do so and therefore the EU is to a certain small degree a self-
interested leader.      
 
EU Contribution towards the Shaping of Global Climate Change 
Regime 
Meanwhile as the leadership debate has been growing the EU has 
been actively involved on the environmental front in a way that has seen it 
shape the regime to some considerable degree. Opposed to the Kyoto 
Protocol and to a range of other multilateral packages such as the Convention 
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on Biodiversity the US’s withdrawal unwittingly paved the way for the 
ambitious EU to make a contribution towards the development of the global 
environmental governance.  It can be argued that the Kyoto Protocol owes its 
existence to the EU more than to any state.        
Interestingly few if any foresaw the emergence of the EU as leader in 
global environmental governance. This may perhaps be because until the 
1987 Single European Act the EU had no common environmental policy and 
there was no formal treaty recognising the importance of the protection of 
the environment. And yet there was evidence that the EU was establishing 
itself through out that period as a standard bearer by achieving competences 
in areas such as the air pollution, water quality and waste disposal. The EU 
economy grew in a way that naturally prompted action on the environmental 
front. By 2014, for example, the EU, with only 28 member states, have 
become the second largest oil consumer in the world after the US. With the 
EU mandarins harbouring ambitions to steer the EU towards leadership on 
the global stage this growth and development came in handy (Oberthuur, 
2007). Prior to this it was the USA which was a global leader and yet by the 
early 1990’s it was clear that opportunities were arising for the EU to surge 
ahead and achieve her ambitions.  
The EU leadership on the environmental issues has not been an 
isolated case, though. Academic enquiry has naturally spread to other policy 
areas such as the multilateral trade negotiations (Smith & Woolcock, 1999), 
international development policy (Orbie, 2007), and to international law 
where the EU has been seen to be active in the International Criminal Court 
(Groenleer & van Schaik, 2005) and the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
(Muller, 2010). In this context, the EU’s contribution towards the 
development of a global climate change regime remains a major interest for 
many academics. There has been a proliferation of observations from the 
outsiders on the implications or perceptions of the EU’s role and leadership 
in negotiations (Killian & Elgstrom, 2010). Out of this analysis on the EU 
leadership in international politics a readable pattern has emerged. 
Commentary has tended to reflect an academic obsession with the EU’s 
inherent constrains; and strengths and potential. To be precise the emphasis 
of a range of scholars particularly Grub and Gupta (2000), Zito (2005), 
Bretherton and Vogler (2006), has been on competence, capability, 
consistence and coherence. Perhaps this has been made possible by the fact 
that while there has been no doubt that the EU is a formidable actor in global 
environmental regime its performance has been variable and contradictory.  
 While the EU has demonstrated high competence, decisiveness and 
exemplariness in such policy areas as trade in toxic waste, the EU has 
previously seen to be both divided and obstructive. The Montreal Protocol 
negotiations of the late 1980’s will prove this (Vogler, 2005, p.840). 
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Inconsistencies are readable in other areas. With regards climate change the 
situation is even more interesting. Despite having shown backbone and drive 
in the greenhouse gas reduction ahead of the Kyoto provisions, the EU is 
seen as having failed to exercise enough flexibility to adequately respond to 
the US’s proposals and was also seen to have been in disarray in New Delhi 
in 2002 (Vogler, 2005, p.840).  
Over the last decade, the EU’s leadership assessments have been 
more encouraging (Keleman & Vogel, 2009; Groenleer & Van Shaik, 2005). 
Emphasis has tended to change with the scholars drifting towards the 
possibilities of the EU leadership and how it could lead-turning its potential 
into action. They have emphasised on the EU’s ‘enhanced’, ‘strengthened’ 
and ‘improved’ leadership record (Keleman & Vogler, 2009; Oberthur & 
Kelly, 2008). To emerge from this positive development has been an 
acknowledgement of the EU’s progress in practical terms. For example, the 
EU’s actorness in the case of the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its actions in its 
own affairs particularly with regards to its ability to successfully set the 
highest CO2 reductions targets for itself and its being active in pushing for 
higher international targets have boosted the EU’s leadership credentials. The 
EU is, it is said, a ‘directional leader’-that is one leading by example setting 
the standards (Parker & Karlsson, 2010; Falkner, 2007). There has also been 
recognition of the EU’s potential. The EU, it is argued, has great potential to 
become a structural leader-that is through a carefully worked out mixture of 
persuasion and ‘carrot and stick’ tactics. For the latter, the EU’s economic 
mighty could come in handy as it could be relied on to force the third 
countries to bend to the EU’s objectives (Vogler & Hannes, 2007). 
International trade negotiations are one area where the EU could, perhaps, 
best exercise this type of leadership. Moreover, the EU’s success in securing 
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by exerting leverage over Russia is 
often cited as an example (Vogler & Hannes, 2007; Damro, 2006). 
Finally, the EU’s leadership has also been observed from another 
angle: the international stage where it has come to be seen as an international 
‘agenda-setter’ (Zito, 2005). This is a reference to the EU’s abilities in 
projecting some of its objectives onto the global stage coupled with a 
promotion of norms and values in trying to influence the negotiations and 
processes. For instance, while the EU did not fully reflect her agenda-setter 
features in 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Summit as shown in Kyoto, it 
has succeeded in taking a lead to other countries in Paris Climate Change 
Conference as an indicators of agenda setter and directional leader. Indeed, 
they didn’t reach to any agreement in Copenhagen Conference in order to 
replace Kyoto Protocol, but Paris conference shows that the EU was able to 
convince to other participant to take an action against climate change. Of 
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course, such an outcome is related to ensuring uniformity failed in 
Copenhagen in 2009. In this context, as long as EU member states speak 
with single voice in the international arena, they are able to strengthen its 
actorness in the international politics and able to continue to take a leader in 
climate change policy. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that with the EU being an ambitious actor in world politics, 
the rise into prominence of climate change naturally came in handy for the 
EU as it provided an opportunity for the EU to assert itself and prove both its 
capacity and presence (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Indeed, although the EU 
is a relatively new actor on the international stage, it has, in a short time, 
evolved its position as a dominant world actor and this remarkable revolution 
is evident in the activities around climate negotiations. However, the real 
question to be answered is whether or not the EU was effective enough? This 
sad reality on the part of the EU further throws light into one fundamental 
point:  the EU’s inherent dilemma is that its strengths generally tend to be the 
source of its weaknesses. For example, the set goal and driving force behind 
the EU’s negotiation mandate stemmed from the EU’s strengths. First, the 
EU is a major economic block encompassing some of the major national 
economies of the world which as has been said earlier partly informed the 
leadership ambitions (Oberthuur, 2009; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 
Egenhofer & Georgiev, 2009). A second but circumstantial strength enjoyed 
by the EU prior to the conference was that the EU had for years enjoyed 
some degree of influence since the US’s refusal to commit the obligations of 
Kyoto in 1997 meaning that the Union had a chance to perpetuate this 
dominance. The EU’s leadership potential was largely seen to have increased 
since Kyoto because since the withdrawal of the US, the EU increased its 
internal cooperation and evolved into a more unified and stronger entity. 
Thirdly the EU had an advantage in that it had set an example by setting 
targets for itself meaning that it had a chance to be taken seriously. And yet 
the combination of these strengths became the source of problems and 
consequently failure.  
Because the ‘EU’, says Ginsberg (1999), ‘is neither a state nor a non-
state actor, and neither a conventional international organisation nor an 
international regime’ (Ginsberg, 1999, p.432). the sheer size, influence and 
economic power of the EU which partly led to its international ambitions 
does not always translate into a capacity to come up with realistic targets nor 
flexibility to be able to react to the unforeseen diktats of climate change 
negotiation process. Despite the fact that the EU does not achieve the success 
of showing its capacity through the climate change conference, the EU is a 
legal entity recognised by the UNFCCC to participate in such events as a 
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Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) - a provision instituted 
in recognition of the EU and other like entities’ competences in specific 
environmental policy areas which are vital in the UNFCCC. Technically and 
in reality, the EU is a member of the UNFCCC and its representation at 
United Nation Climate Change Conference such as Kyoto or Copenhagen 
attests to that. In this context, the EU is not eligible to vote separately in the 
UNFCCC. In addition to that, it is only on issues of exclusive EU 
competence that the EU is eligible to vote with the number of votes equalling 
that of its member states. Instead, both the EU and Member States decide on 
their priorities and obligations together because it is not permissible for them 
to vote concurrently (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 22.2.). Moreover, this 
provision becomes a nullity for the EU in the event that any of the Members 
States exercise the right to vote (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 18).  
Despite the fact that in traditional international relations terms only 
states with right to sign treaties with other states qualify as actors in the 
world system (Bull, 1982; Mearsheimer, 2007), scholarship has evolved with 
the spread of the EU influence to pay attention to this phenomenon which 
renders the EU as a special kind of an actor. This section seeks to examine 
the EU’s actorness on the international system through a body of literature 
advanced by the many scholars who have sought to explain this complex 
nature and uniqueness of the EU. As has been said, this complex nature of 
the EU manifests itself more vividly in the sense that it is some kind of an 
emerging state with features of a state while at the same time it remains an 
international organisation bringing together fragmented activity with itself 
acting as the convener and an overseer. Over the years, and despite the 
varying interpretations, scholarship is almost united in the view that the EU’s 
participation on the international politics can no longer be contested and 
neither can the EU’s actor status be diminished. And yet problems still 
persist.     
 
References: 
Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006). Conceptualizing Actors and Actorness, C. 
Bretherton and J. Vogler (Ed.), The European Union as Global Actor, 
London: Routledge. 
Bull, H., (1982). Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 21, September/December, pp. 149-170. 
Damro, C., (2006). EU-UN Environmental Relations: Shared Competence 
and Effective Multilateralism, Laatikainen, K. and Smith, K. E. (Ed.), The 
European Union at the United Nations, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Elgström, O. & Smith, M., (2006). The European Union’s Roles in 
International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, London: Routledge. 
Falkner, R. (2007). The political economy of normative power Europe: EU 
European Scientific Journal February 2016 edition vol.12, No.5  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
295 
environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 14(4), pp. 507-523. 
Ginsberg, R. H. (1999). Conceptualizing the European Union as an 
International Actor?, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3), pp. 429-
454. 
Groenleer, M. & van Schaik, L., (2005). The EU as an ‘Intergovernmental’ 
Actor in Foreign Affairs: Case Studies of the International Criminal Court 
and the Kyoto Protocol, Centre for European Policy Studies Working 
Document, 228, August.  
Gupta, J. & Ringius, L. (2001). The EU's Climate Leadership: Reconciling 
Ambition and Reality, International Environmental Agreements, 1, pp. 281-
299. 
Gupta, J., & Grubb, M., (2000). Climate Change and European Leadership: 
A Sustainable Role for Europe, Kluwer, Dordrecht.  
Hill, C., (1993). The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing 
Europe’s International Role, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp. 
305-328. 
Jupille, J. & J. A. Caporaso (1998). States, Agency and Rules: the European 
Union in Global Environmental Politics, C. Rhodes (Ed.), The European 
Union in the World Community, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Keleman, R. D & Vogel, D., (2009). Trading Places: The Role of the United 
States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics, 
Comparative Political Studies, 43(4), pp. 427-456. 
Kellerhaus, F., (2010). The Role of the European Union at the United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Available at :< 
http://essay.utwente.nl/60336/1/BSc_F_Kellerhaus.pdf> [Accessed 15 June 
2015]. 
Kilian, B. & Elgström, O., (2010). Still a Green Leader? The European 
Union’s Role  in International Climate Negotiations, Accepted for 
Publication in Cooperation and  Conflict, No. 3, Available at: 
<http://cac.sagepub.com/content/45/3/255.abstract > [Accessed 13 June 
2015]. 
Mearsheimer, J. J., (2007). Structural Realism, M. Kurki and S. Smith, (ed.), 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, OUP, Oxford: T. 
Dunne. 
Muller, B., (2010). Copenhagen 2009: Failure or final wake-up call for our 
leaders?, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2010 February. 
Nabers, D., (2008). Leadership and Discursive Hegemony in International 
Politics, Paper Prepared for the 1st Regional Powers Network Conference, 
Hamburg, September 15-16.  
Oberthuur, S., (2007). The European Union in International Climate Policy: 
The Prospect for Leadership, Intereconomics - Review of European 
European Scientific Journal February 2016 edition vol.12, No.5  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
296 
Economic Policy, 42(2), pp. 77–83. 
Oberthuur, S., & Kelly, R., (2008). EU Leadership in International Climate 
Policy: Achievements and Challenges, International Spectator, 43(3), pp. 35-
50. 
Oberthuur, S., (2009). The Performance of the EU in International 
Institutions: Negotiating on Climate Change, Paper Presented at 
International Studies Association Annual Convention, New York, February 
15-18. 
Parker, C. and Karlsson, C. (2010). Climate Change and the European 
Union’s Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 48(4), pp. 923-943. 
Sannerstedt, A., (2005). Negotiations in European Union Committees, O. 
Elgström and C. Jönsson (Ed.), European Union Negotiations: Processes, 
Networks and Institutions, London: Routledge.  
Smith, M. & Woolcock, S., (1999). European Commercial Policy: A 
Leadership Role in the new Millennium?, European Foreign Affairs Review,  
4(4), pp. 439-62. 
Underdal, A. (1994). Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of 
Management, I. W. Zartman (Ed.), International multilateral negotiation: 
Approaches to the management of complexity, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
United Nations, (1992), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.FCCC/INFORMAL/84, Available at :< 
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/>, [Accessed 11 June 2015]. 
Vogler, J. & Hannes, S.R., (2007). The European Union in Global 
Environmental Governance: Leadership in the making?, International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 7(4), pp. 389-415. 
Vogler, J., (2005). The European Contribution to Global Environmental 
Governance’, International Affairs, 81(4), pp. 835-850. 
Young, O. R. (1991). International Governance. Protecting the Environment 
in a Stateless Society, , New York: Cornell University Press. 
Zito, A. R. (2005). The European Union as an Environmental Leader in a 
Global Environment, Globalizations, 2(3), pp. 363-375. 
 
 
 
  
